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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
WATER & WATERCOURSES--PUBLIC LANDS--FEDERAL CONTROL OF NON-
NAVIGABLE WATERS AS RELATED TO FIsHERmE.-In 1951 the Federal Power
Commission licensed a power company to construct Pelton Dam on lands
reserved by the United States as a power site on the Deschutes River in
Oregon.1 The State of Oregon protested that the Federal Power Commis-
sion could not grant the license without the permission of the state, and also
objected to the adequacy of the proposed fish conservation facilities. The
Commission denied a rehearing and the state sought a review by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court set aside the Commission's
order.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, with several
states filing briefs as amici curiae, held, reversed. The Desert Land Act of
1877,' relinquishing control over unappropriated waters on public lands to
state law, does not apply to the waters on reserved lands of the United States,
even though they may be nonnavigable.' Provision for fish conservation
facilities is within the discretion of the Commission. Federal Power Corn-
mission v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
This decision shows clearly the extent to which the federal government
has encroached upon what was formerly considered by the several states
their right to control the nonnavigable waters within their boundaries.
Earlier Supreme Court decisions on this matter had greatly modified the
balance of power between the United States and the states concerning the
control of lakes and rivers, and the present decision is a further example.
The direct result of the ruling is that Pelton Dam may now be constructed
regardless of the wishes of the State of Oregon. The indirect effect is that
the anadromous fish5 population of the substantial watershed of the Des-
chutes River which lies above the dam site is now to be controlled entirely
by the fish conservation methods approved by the Commission. Prior to
this decision, the regulation of the fish would have been the responsibility
of the State of Oregon, working through its fish and game, departments.
The control which the Federal Power Commission has now been granted
over a state's program of fish conservation is indicative of the widening
area in which the United States has concerned itself over matters which had
long been within the purview of the state governments. The gradual growth
of the federal power in the regulation of waters may be seen in the opinions
handed down by the Supreme Court over the past century and a half. The
expansion of federal control is first clearly seen in Gibbons v. Ogden,' in
which the Supreme Court looked to the commerce clause of the Constitution'
to decide that the power to regulate commerce necessarily included power
over navigation.
For many years that decision represented the only important step in
the direction of expanded federal control. Indeed, the Supreme Court re-
'It derived its authority from the Federal Power Act, 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), as
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1952).
'211 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1954).
'19 STAT. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1952).
'The holding that navigability is immaterial is implied since there was no finding as
to the navigability of the river.
'Fish ascending rivers from the sea for breeding purposes. In this instance, especial-
ly salmon and steelhead trout.
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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fused to condone an extension of that control over the use of waters for
reclamation purposes. As recently as 1935 the Court confirmed the belief
that the express intent of the Desert Land Act of 1877 was to permit the in-
dividual states to control all non-appropriated waters on public lands within
each state.'
This tendency to limit federal control was not to continue, for the con-
cept of federal preeminence in the realm of water rights was given renewed
impetus in 1940 by the opinion in United States v. Appalachian Power Co."
The Court there decided that the federal government could impose condi-
tions unrelated to navigation in any decision to build a dam on a stream
which, though not navigable at present, could feasibly be made so. The
opinion was based on the theory that the authority of Congress over naviga-
ble waters was as broad as the needs of commerce, and that a dam on this
particular river would have an effect on its possible future navigability.
The following year the Court decided in a similar vein that the federal gov-
ernment has the power to authorize dams on nonnavigable parts of other-
wise navigable rivers in order to preserve or promote commerce on the navi-
gable portions.' These cases marked the first advancement of federal pow-
er into the domain of state control over nonnavigable waters.
In 1946 the Court was faced directly with the question whether a fed-
eral power development project, even though located on a navigable river,
had to be licensed or approved by the state in which the power site was situ-
ated. The Court held, in First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Commission,'
that it was not necessary for the project to comply with state law, although
the Commission, as set forth in the Federal Power Act, might choose to re-
quire such compliance. The opinion showed the court's concern that the
requirement of a state license, as a condition precedent to securing a federal
license for the same project, would give the state a veto power over the fed-
eral government's attempt to achieve a comprehensive, nation-wide plan for
water resource utilization.
The present case marks the extension of federal control into a new di-
mension, that of regulating the waters within a state because the lands
through which the waters flows are reservations of the United States.
Where formerly the federal government exercised no direct control over
surplus waters on the public lands without the consent of the state involved,
sKansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906).
'California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
1311 U.S. 377 (1940).
"Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
-328 U.S. 152 (1946).
""The words defined in this act shall have the following meanings for purposes of
this Act, to wit:
"(1) 'public lands' means such lands and interests in lands owned by the United
States as are subject to private appropriation and disposed under public land
laws. It shall not include 'reservations,' as hereinafter defined;
"(2) 'reservations' means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian
reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands
owned by the United States and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from pri-
vate appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and
interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall not in-
clude national monuments or national parks,..." 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16
U.S.C. § 796(1), (2) (1952).
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it now can exercise plenary power over waters on lands of the United States
which are denominated "reservations." Any relationship to navigability
has thus become irrelevant in these areas.
The dissenting opinion strongly urged that the term "reserved lands"
as contemplated by the Federal Power Act meant only that the lands were
withdrawn from homestead entry, and that the water rights were not dis-
turbed. But the majority held otherwise, and by its interpretation of the
wording of the Act has promulgated a radical extension of federal control
over water rights.
In the field of conservation of fisheries, the federal government has ob-
viously long been able to exert an influence over the regulation of migratory
fish in navigable waters. A recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals emphasized this fact." In that case the court held that if compli-
ance with the laws of the State of Washington would prevent the licensing
of a dam which the Power Commission felt was needed on the navigable
Cowlitz River, then the state could not interfere by requiring a state license.
The state law," in an endeavor to protect the fishing industry, prohibited
the construction of a dam over a certain height on that river, on the ground
that a higher dam would prevent the migration of salmon. While elaborate
plans were contemplated in the report of the Federal Power Commission
looking toward safe transmission to fish to waters above the dam, the court
indicated that the adequacy of those plans was at the discretion of the Com-
mission, and that the court was powerless to interfere so long as the findings
of the Commission were supported by "substantial evidence."
Much the same willingness to leave the adequacy of fish conservation
measures to the discretion of the Federal Power Commission is shown in the
instant Supreme Court case. Here, it is further held that the argument
that Pelton Dam will preclude certain plans for the Columbia River Basin,
which contemplate the concentration of fish in the Deschutes River, is one
to be considered by the Commission, or that it should be directed to Con-
gress. But no mention is made of the concern of the State of Oregon over
this item. Thus it is evident that the federal government can disregard the
wishes of a state concerning its fisheries wherever it believes that the inter-
ests of the nation are best served by permitting a dam to be built, and this
applies even where the waters are nonnavigable, provided only that the
power site is on reserved lands of the United States.
The effects of this decision are far-reaching, particularly in the west-
ern states. This would be true even though the federal government with-
drew no additional lands from the public domain, which it apparently may
do without limitation, since a great many of the best possible power sites
have already been withdrawn. For example, it is estimated that almost all
potential power sites on Oregon streams have been reserved by the United
States." In the neighboring State of Washington every principal power
"Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F.2d 391 (9th
Cir. 1953).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 75.20.010 (1955).
"COLUMBIA BASIN INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE, MINUTFs OF EIGHTY-FOURTHII MEETING,
exhibit III at 2 (1955) (statement by Mr. A. G. Higgs, Assistant Attorney General
of Oregon) (mimeographed).
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site is within a federal reserve. " In light of these facts, it becomes evident
that a state's regulation of its fisheries can in many instances be subordi-
nated to the desire for power production, if the Federal Power Commission
feels that this is justified. This is true even though the waters are non-
navigable.
The problem is intensified by the fact that the term "reservation" is
not limited to power sites. It includes any other lands set aside for a snecific
purpose,' at least in the contemplation of the Federal Power Act; and such
lands as army installations, Indian reservations, and national forests be-
come involved. The national forests alone cover large areas, particularly
above the limits of navigability, and in some of the western states they con-
stitute more than one-fourth of the total area. Necessarily, many streams
not otherwise covered by a power site reservation will now fall within the
primary control of the United States for purposes of dam construction.
From the point of view of the conservation of migratory fish, it is high-
ly possible that the federal policies on the subject are more beneficial than
the policies, and divergent efforts, of many of the states. If this be so,
then the fact that large areas of the West are reservations of the United
States may result in a wiser over-all management of this resource than if
each state had the final decision as to whether a given dam is desirable or
not.
The matter is not so easily resolved in those states where the people have
shown real concern for the future of their fisheries for both commercial and
recreational purposes. One illustration of this will suffice: The legislature
of Oregon has set aside the lower portion of the Rogue River for recreational
purposes primarily, and has set specific limitations on the construction of
federal dams downstream from a certain point." Following the present deci-
sion the Federal Power Commission could, if it saw fit, authorize the con-
struction of power dams on those parts of the Rogue which flow through
certain forest reserves, despite the desire of the State of Oregon to dedicate
that river to recreational purposes.
This is but an isolated instance; in another area the federal govern-
ment may well decide that the recreational values of a river are of para-
mount importance to the entire nation, or that migratory fish alone are of
greater economic value than power development. The important point is
that the power to make these decisions and the responsibility for them have
been largely withdrawn from the people of the individual states, of the
West especially, and placed in the hands of the federal government.
ROBERT W. JASPERSON
'
1Id., exhibit VI at 1 (statement by Mr. W. A. Galbraith, Director, Department of
Conservation and Development of Washington).
' See note 13 8upra.
'"R0- REv. STAT. § 542.210 (1955).
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